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Executive  Summary 
The objective of this study is to measure  economic payoffs from a grain cartel.  Two basic approaches 
to extract economic  rents  are  considered:  (i)  Mandatory  supply controls to  restrict production  and  raise  grain 
price, and  (2)  export price discrimination using export taxes  or subsidies. 
The  economic  impacts  of different  producer  cartel  scenarios  were  estimated  using  a  long-term, 
nine-region  world trade  simulation  model  incorporating  the  assumptions  of neoclassical  trade  theory.  The 
SWOPSIM  program  was used  to  write the  model  equations.  Economic  Research  Service trade  data  for  1989 
were used to initialize the model.  Results  reflect long-run changes from 1989conditions and are at  1989 general 
price levels. 
The  model  simultaneously  estimated  outcomes  in markets  for nine  commodities:  beef,  pork, poultry 
meat,  wheat, corn, coarse  grains (other  than corn), oilseeds (soybeans,  rapeseed,  and  sunflower seed),  oilmeal, 
and  sugar.  Cross-effects  among  commodities  and  input-output  relationships  between  field crop and  livestock 
production are accounted  for by substitution and complementary  coefficients in behavioral equations.  Countries 
and groups of countries included in the model  are Australia, Canada,  the European  Community (EC), European 
Free Trade  Association  (EFTA),  the  United  States  (US),  Japan,  and  the  rest  of the  world (ROW). 
The  simulation results  report  the  consequences  of restricting  only US  grain production  (wheat,  corn, 
and  other  coarse  grains)  from  5 to  20%  below  the  1989 production  level.  Grain  supply  restrictions  were 
presumed  to  be  mandatory,  hence  taxpayers  incurred  no  additional  outlays  over those  in  1989 .  World  price 
increases  were modest  for wheat, but greater  for corn and  other coarse  grains in part because  of differences  in 
market  share among  grains.  US consumers  of grain and  grain products  buy less at higher prices and are  worse 
off, as  is the  country as  a whole.  Consumer  surplus falls nearly  $2 billion when grain supply is reduced  20 %. 
Higher  grain prices  and  lower costs  more  than  compensate  producers  for less output,  despite  lower 
receipts  attending  an elastic demand.  According to simulation results, cartel-like action restricting  US  supplies 
by 15%  would most  benefit  American  grain producers. 
Consumers  in  the  US  and  the  world lose  more  than  producers  gain  from  cartel  action  restricting 
production  and lowering US  exports of grain.  Other  competing exporters  enjoy net benefits from higher world 
prices.  However, because  the  rest  of the  world is a net  consumer,  net  economic  welfare of other countries  is 
reduced.  Also, overall world income  is reduced  by a cartel. 
As additional  global production comes  under the  control of the  cartel, more  producer  surplus can be 
extracted  from consumers.  Results  were simulated  for grain producers  in four developed  countries  or regions 
(Australia, Canada,  EC, and  US)  forming a cartel and simultaneously  restricting production from 5 to 20%.  As 
expected, world prices rise more  with the comprehensive  grain cartel than with the US acting alone.  The more 
comprehensive  international  cartel  helps  producers  extract greater  rents  from consumers. 
It  is  notable  that  none  of the  supply  restriction  schemes  would  benefit  the  US  as  a  nation. 
Rest-of-the-world  and  total  world welfare  losses  mount  when supply restrictions  are  tightened  from 5 to  20% 
of market  output.  When  the  US  alone  tightly restricts  grain production,  it loses more  than  ROW.  When the 
US, Canada,  Australia, and  the EC jointly restrict production,  ROW  incurs greater  welfare losses than  the  US. 
Turning next to support  subsidies without supply controls, we estimated  that  net benefits  to  producers 
are  greatest  with export subsidies, expanding exports by 30%  and with an attendant  increase  in domestic  prices. 
The  cartel  can  subsidize  exports  with collections  from  producers,  leaving  its  members  with some  net  gain. 
Results  are even more  favorable  for producers  if taxpayers pay the export subsidy as under  the current  Export 
Enhancement  Program (EEP).  However, because national welfare is reduced, a government truly representative 
of the  nation's economic  welfare would not  rationally choose  to  subsidize exports. Overall  US  welfare  is  modestly  increased  when  domestic  price  is  lowered  with an  export  tariff and 
exports decline.  In  contrast,  the  rest of the  world as  a net importer  benefits  from plans increasing  US  exports 
and  lowering the  world price of grains.  But,  any  form  of market  distortion lowers overall global welfare. 
Total  numbers  are  smaller  but patterns  are  similar when only US  com producers  attempt  the optimal 
subsidy or tariff strategy.  A US com-only producer cartel would choose an export subsidy because the producers' 
benefits  are  positive even if they pay the  export subsidy. 
Outcomes  were  simulated  in  which  percentage  increases  in  US  exports  were  matched  by  equal 
percentage  increases  in exports of other major competitors  (Canada,  the European  Community, and Australia). 
Retaliation  causes  the average  cost of subsidizing US  exports to nearly double to achieve  any given percentage 
increase  in  exports.  Retaliation  by competing  exporters  removes  much  of the  attractiveness  of US  export 
subsidies.  If  producers  pay for export  subsidies, their  net  gains are  sharply eroded  with retaliation.  Welfare 
losses to the  US  as  a nation and  to the world enlarge  with retaliation  to subsidies.  Thus the  US  and  the world 
have a stake  in successful multilateral  negotiation  reducing  subsidies and  attendant  retaliation. 
It is conceivable that an effort by producers  to form a cartel would so alienate  the public that Congress 
would terminate  current  commodity programs,  including export assistance  on grain.  Net benefits to producers 
from cartel activity never approached  the $7 billion in rents they collect from current programs.  It seems unlikely 
that  a producer  group would risk gains of this size for the  prospect  of cartel  rents  a sixth the  size or less from 
international  markets. 
Gains  to  US  producers  are  less  for  a wheat  cartel  than  for  either  the  feed  grain  cartel  or for  the 
wheat-feed  grain cartel  included herein.  The  unfavorable outcomes  originate  from  the  export demand  for US 
wheat  made  highly elastic by opportunities  to  substitute  feed  grain for  wheat  in production  and  consumption 
especially in the long run.  That is, a high wheat price and controlled production of wheat encourages  importers 
to  produce  wheat, cut back feed  grain production,  and  import  low-cost feed  grains. The Economics  of 
Grain Producer Cartels 
by 
James  Gleckler and Luther Tweeten· 
The  nation  and  agriculture  producers  continue  to  search  for means  to  capture  more  of the  potential 
gains from trade.  Various  farm  group periodically call for some  form of grain cartel  featuring  supply control, 
subsidies, or tariffs to  gain from  trade. 
The objective of this study is to measure  economic payoffs from a grain cartel.  This study differs from 
previous  studies  by  including  more  recent  data  from  a  larger  number  of countries  and  commodities  in  an 
international  trade  model  using long-term behavioral  coefficients. 
By emphasizing  impacts on consumers  and the public at large as  well as producers,  this study presents 
a more  comprehensive  but  less  attractive  outcome  of a cartel  compared  to  many  previous  studies.  Market 
distortions reducing economic welfare of  consumers  and the public at large diminish the attractiveness of a cartel, 
even with the  assumptions  made  here  of a perfectly organized  cartel  operated  by perfectly disciplined members 
at  no  cost for administration  (see  Donsimoni  et al.; Osborne). 
Background 
Under a 1933 wheat agreement,  the United States, Australia, Canada,  and Argentina attempted  a cartel 
arrangement  that  committed  member  countries  to  cut acreage  15%  to boost  wheat  prices  (see  Tweeten  1989, 
p. 325).  Only Australia  honored  the  agreement.  After  Argentina  exceeded  its export quota,  the  agreement 
collapsed  in 1934. 
Subsequent  international wheat agreements  made modest attempts  to stabilize prices but a more serious 
effort was mounted  with the  International  Grains  Arrangement  (IGA)  -- a product of the  Kennedy  Round  of 
multilateral  trade  negotiations  (Tweeten  1992, p. 214).  Wheat  exporting  countries  agreed  not to  sell below a 
world  price  of $1. 73 per  bushel  of wheat,  Gulf port  basis.  The  arrangement  seemed  feasible  when  it was 
negotiated  during the  1966 wheat  shortage.  Only the  United  States  attempted  to honor  the  agreement  in the 
subsequent  excess supply situation.  It held wheat off the export market  for six months.  Other  countries  in the 
IGA continued to sell and the arrangement  collapsed in 1967. Since that year, no serious attempt  has been made 
to revive its supply management  and price features.  However, the National Farmers  Union, the National Farmers 
Organization,  and  American  Agriculture  Movement  continue  to  press  for supply controls  to  raise  grain prices 
in domestic  and  international  markets  (see  Ray and  Plaxico). 
Scope and Framework 
Two basic approaches  to extract economic  rents  are  considered:  (i)  Mandatory  supply controls 
to  restrict  production  and  raise  grain price, and  (2)  export price discrimination  using export  taxes  or 
subsidies. 
Figure  1 shows a world market  where  a producer  cartel  of all exporting countries  controls the 
world supply ES.  To maximize economic  rent  with one price, the  cartel  facing  domestic  plus foreign 
demand  (ED)  restricts supplies to Q s where supply (ES)  equals marginal revenue (MR).  The world price 
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2 P  w is the same  in domestic  and export markets.  This option could be operationalized  with mandatory 
supply control  as  used for American  wheat prior to  1964. 
Q.  Q 
Figure 1.  World Grain Market. 
The larger  the proportion  of world production  and  exports  controlled,  the  more  inelastic  the 
export demand  and hence the greater  the opportunity for collecting economic  rent.  As  shown in Table 
1, the  US  does  not control  a majority of production  in any of the  major grains, although over 40% of 
world com was produced  in the US  in 1989.  Even US  grain producers  teamed  with export competitors 
Australia,  Canada,  and the EC would not supply a majority of grains globally. 
An alternative  not  requiring  supply control  would be for producers  to  collect  rents  from  an 
optimal tariff or subsidy with price discrimination among  markets.  Producers  facing an inelastic export 
demand  and free market equilibrium price POw in Figure 2 could impose tariff P'  w-Pd.  Tariff revenue c+e 
collected  on the  difference  between  the new world price P'  w and the domestic  price Pd  would need  to 
offset producer  losses (a+b+c+d).  This would require  the value in area e to exceed the  value in area 
a+b+d. If  the demand  were so elastic that area e does not exist, a producer  cartel would not use a tariff 
to extract  economic  rent.  A government  cartel could collect rent c+e which would be a positive value 
c collected  from producers  even if demand  were so elastic that e is zero. 
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Figure 2.  Collect Tariff with Lowered Domestic Price. 
Table 1.  Percent of World Grain Production, 1989. 
Wheat  Com  Coarse Grain 
US  10.4  41.2  8.9 
Canada  4.5  1.2  5.0 
Australia  2.3  0.1  1.8 
EC  14.9  5.4  16.1 
All 4 Regions  32.2  47.9  31.9 
If export  demand  is  elastic, producers  might utilize an  export  subsidy rather  than  a tariff to 
extract  a cartel  rent.  Beginning with world equilibrium price  P"w  in Figure 3, producers  could provide 
an export subsidy Pd-P' w per unit or b+c+d  +e+f in total.  If  the world price decline (P"  w to P'  w)  were 
small enough, this subsidy might be less than producers' gain of a+b+c so that the net gain to producers 
a-d-e-f would be positive. 
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Figure 3.  Raise Domestic Price and Pay Export Subsidy. 
Long-term  behavioral  coefficients  can  be  used  to  make  some  preliminary  estimates  of cartel 
arrangements.  The optimal  cartel  strategy depends  heavily on export demand  elasticities  which in turn 
depend  on domestic  supply and  demand  elasticities  and  on world price  transmission  elasticities.  The 
more inelastic the export demand,  the more success a cartel  is likely to have in restricting output to raise 
income. 
With export demand  elasticities for anyone country depending  on domestic  supply and demand 
elasticities and  price transmission  elasticities  in all other countries, the  US  export demand  elasticity Ex 
for quantity  X of a commodity  can be calculated  using the  equation: 
n 
Ex = ~  [EdiEpdi(QdX)-EsiEpSj(QJX)] 
1=1 
(1) 
where  Edi and  Esi are  price elasticities of domestic  demand  and  supply respectively in foreign country i, 
Q di  and  Q Si  are  demand  and  supply  quantities  respectively,  and  ~i and  ~i are  price  transmission 
elasticities  for demand  and  supply price respectively  (Tweeten  1992, p. 33; Dixit and  Gardiner).  The 
5 long-term domestic  demand  and supply elasticities were derived from estimates  by Tyers and Anderson 
and  the  IIASA  model  (see  Seeley).  Price transmission  elasticities are  from  Sullivan (Table  2). 
Table  3 reports  the  calculated  US  export  demand  elasticities  for  grains  implicit in the  trade 
model  employed  in  subsequent  analysis.  Results  indicate  that  US  producers  face  an  elastic  export 
demand  in the long run.  The high (absolute  value) elasticities indicate that the ability of a US  producer 
cartel  to extract rents  from the world markets  by supply control or an export tariff is limited, at least in 
the long run.  Of course, the overall impacts of alternatives  are  impossible to determine  without a more 
comprehensive  quantitative  assessment  in a model  accommodating  major world grain markets. 
The economic impacts of different producer  cartel scenarios were estimated  using a nine-region 
world trade  simulation  model  incorporating  the  assumptions  of neoclassical  trade  theory  (Roningen  et 
aI., March  1991; September  1991.).  The  SWOPSIM  program  was  used  to  write the  model  equations. 
The previously described long-term coefficients are used in the model's behavioral equations.  Economic 
Research  Service trade data for 1989 were used to initialize the model.  Results  reflect long-run changes 
from  1989 conditions  and  are  at  1989 general  price levels. 
The  model  simultaneously  estimates  outcomes  in markets  for  nine  commodities:  beef,  pork, 
poultry meat,  wheat, com, coarse  grains (other  than  com), oilseeds (soybeans,  rapeseed,  and sunflower 
seed), oilmeal, and sugar.  Cross-effects among commodities and input-output  relationships between field 
crop  and  livestock production  are  accounted  for  by  substitution  and  complementary  coefficients  in 
behavioral  equations. 
Countries  and  groups of countries  included in the  model  are  Australia,  Canada,  the  European 
Community  (EC),  European  Free Trade  Association  (EFTA),  the  United  States  (US),  Japan,  and  the 
rest of the world (ROW). 









Source:  See  Sullivan 
Table 3.  US Export Demand Elasticities from Equation 1. 
Commodity  Long Term 
Wheat  -9.7 
Com  -6.2 














-4.8 Simulation Results 
We  first address  implications of a cartel  strategy of mandatory  supply control before  considering price 
discrimination strategies  of export subsidies and tariffs.  Outcomes  are  predicted  for the  US  acting alone  and 
for the  US  acting in concert with other  major developed  country exporters.  Estimates  are  made  for a cartel 
of all grain producers  and  for com producers  alone. 
A perfectly  cooperative  USDA  (e.g. taxpayers)  is  assumed,  which  allows  all  cartel  measures  to  be 
superimposed  on top  of existing 1989 commodity  support  measures.  Supply reductions  in this  study  are  in 
addition  to  the  approximate  5%  reduction  (accounting  for slippage)  from the  10%  set aside  in 1989. 
Grain farmers  are assumed  to behave according to the market  price while being rewarded  at  the target 
price.  The calculated  producer  welfare change  in these  simulations  does  not differentiate  between producer 
and  taxpayer gains and  losses. 
Supply Control. The simulation results reported  in Table 4 are the consequences  of restricting US grain 
production  (wheat, com, and other coarse grains) from 5%  to a high of 20% below the  1989production level. 
US  commodity  programs  for non-grains  were not changed  from  1989 levels.  Grain  supply restrictions  were 
presumed  to  be  mandatory,  hence  taxpayers  incurred  no  additional  outlays  over  those  in  1989.  The 
Conservation Reserve  Program was assumed  to continue  at its 1989 level.  World price increases  were modest 
for wheat, but greater  for com and other coarse  grains in part because  of differences  in market  share  among 
grains.  US consumers  of grain and grain products buy less at higher prices and  are worse off, as is the country 
as  a whole.  Consumer  surplus falls nearly  $2 billion when grain supply is reduced  20%. 
Higher  grain prices  and  lower costs  more  than  compensate  producers  for  less output,  despite  lower 
receipts attending an elastic demand.  According to simulation results, cartel-like action restricting US supplies 
by 15% would most benefit American  grain producers.  If  acreage  controls rather than marketing  quotas were 
used  to reduce  supplies, much  more  than  15 % of acres  would need  to  be diverted due  to  program  slippage. 
Consumers  in  the  US  and  the  world  lose  more  than  producers  gain  from  cartel  action  restricting 
production and lowering US exports of grain.  Other competing exporters enjoy net benefits from higher world 
prices.  However, because  the  rest  of the  world is a net  consumer,  net  economic  welfare of other countries 
is reduced.  Also, overall world income  is reduced  by a cartel. 
Results  from  a  simulation  restricting  production  for  US  com alone  are  reported  in  Table  5.  The 
impacts  are  very similar to those in Table 4 because  com is such a large component  of US  grain production. 
Welfare  losses in the rest of the world (ROW)  are  greater  when all US  grain production  is restricted  (Table 
4) than  when only com is restricted  (Table  5). 
Benefits  to com producers  peak  with supply restricted  about  15% (Table  5).  This outcome  is similar 
to that for all grains shown in Table 4.  Of the developed country competitors, only Australia exports com and 
would benefit  from the higher world prices apparent  in Table  5. 
As  additional  global production  comes  under  the  control of the  cartel, more  surplus can be extracted 
from consumers.  Table  6 reports  results  of a simulation where  grain producers  in four developed  countries 
or regions (Australia,  Canada,  EC, and  US)  form  a cartel  and  simultaneously  restrict  production  from  5 to 
20 %.  Obviously, a given percentage  cut in output is a much greater absolute reduction in tonnage  in the more 
comprehensive  cartel.  As expected, world prices rise more with the comprehensive  grain cartel (Table 6) than 
with the  US  acting  alone  (Table  4).  The  more  comprehensive  international  cartel  helps producers  extract 
greater  rents  from consumers.  Hence,  consumer  losses are  greater  in the comprehensive  grain cartel  shown 
in Table  6. 
From a narrow American  perspective, one might hope that economic  rent extracted  from ROW  would 
raise the producer  surplus enough  to offset consumer  losses, leaving the  US better  off.  That  is not the case, 
however.  American welfare losses increase with more  stringent supply control in Tables 4,5, and 6.  US losses 
are  not much  less when acting in concert with other grain exporters  (Table  6) than when acting alone  (Table 
4).  It is notable  that  none  of the  supply restriction  schemes  in Tables  4,5, or 6 would benefit  the  US  as  a 
nation.  Rest-of-the-world  and total  world welfare losses mount  when supply restrictions  are  tightened  from 
5 to 20% of market  output.  When  the  US  alone  tightly restricts  grain production, it loses more  than ROW. 

















Consumers  Total  Total 
($ Million) 
-439  -44  -313 
-882  -266  -592 
-1,330  -667  -837 
-1,782  -1,248  -1,047 
TableS.  Impacts of Restricting US Com Production. 
Welfare Impacts 
US Com 
Supply Reduction  US 
Producers  Consumers  Total 
(Percent)  ($ Million) 
5  375  -460  -85 
10  624  -928  -303 
15  746  -1,404  -657 
20  738  -1,887  -1,149 
Increase in World 
Price 
World  Corn & 
Total  Wheat  Coarse 
Grain 
(Percent) 
-357  1  3 
-858  2  6 
-1,504  3  9 
-2,295  4  13 
Increase in 
World Price 
ROW  World 
Total  Total  Com 
(Percent) 
-226  -311  5 
-427  -730  9 
-602  -1,259  14 
-750  -1,899  19 
When the US, Canada, Australia, and the EC  jointly restrict production, ROW incurs greater welfare losses than the US. 
Price Discrimination.  Mandatory  production controls assumed  in the foregoing  scenarios potentially 
can benefit producers without discrimination between foreign and domestic markets.  But controls are difficult 
to administer  and  are unsuccessful  in raising US  national  income.  An alternative  is to forsake  controls but 
to use export tariffs and  subsidies to discriminate  pricing between  domestic  and foreign markets. 
Price discrimination scenarios conforming to the strategy presented  in Figures 2 and 3 were simulated 
with results  presented  in Table  7.  Domestic  grain  prices  for wheat,  com, and  other  coarse  grains  were 
adjusted  proportionally to bring changes  in US  exports as  indicated  in the  first column of Table 7. 
8 Table 6.  Restricting Grain Production - US, Canada, Australia, and EC. 
Welfare Impacts 
Grain Supply  US  Increase in World 
Reduction for Each  Price 
Cartel Member 
ROW  World  Com & 
Producers  Consumers  Total  Total  Total  Wheat  Coarse 
Grain 
(Percent)  ($ Million)  (Percent) 
5  632  -633  -5  -249  -254  3  5 
10  1,084  -1,272  -187  -565  -753  7  10 
15  1,339  -1,918  -578  -947  -1,526  10  15 
20  1,399  -2,570  -1,171  -1,394  -2,565  14  20 
Using export subsidies to fix the domestic price above the world price decreases  domestic consumption 
but increases  production and exports.  Using export tariffs to fix the domestic price below the world price has 
the  opposite  effect.  The border  subsidies listed in the top  three  rows of Table  7 (4th column)  corresponds 
to area b+c+d+e+f  in Figure 3.  The border  levies (tariffs) listed in the lower three rows correspond  to area 
c+e in Figure 2.  Producer  and  consumer  welfare  impacts  in Table  7 are  changes  from actual  1989 values. 
A grain cartel  of producers  financing export subsidies  (see  negative numbers  in bottom three  rows) 
will earn economic rents  if subsidies paid to export grain are  less than the extra producer  surplus accruing to 
producers  from the higher domestic  price, or iftariffs (see  positive values in bottom three  rows) collected by 
producers  on exports are  more than the losses to producers  from the lower domestic price.  Given the elastic 
export  demand,  producers  gain from  export  subsidies  and  lose from  export  tariffs.  The  simulation  model 
shows that export subsidy payments are  less than the added  producer surplus when domestic prices are raised 
and  exports  increased  by  export  subsidies.  The  net  gain  to  producers  declines  proportionally  as  export 
subsidies increase. 
Net benefits to producers  are  greatest  with export subsidies, expanding exports by 30% and  with an 
attendant  increase  in domestic  prices (top  row of Table 7).  The cartel can subsidize exports with collections 
from producers,  leaving its members  with some  net  gain.  Results  are  even more  favorable  for producers  if 
taxpayers  pay  the  export  subsidy  as  under  the  current  Export  Enhancement  Program  (EEP).  However, 
because  national welfare is reduced,  a government truly representative  of  the nation's economic welfare would 
not  rationally choose to subsidize exports. 
Overall  US  welfare is modestly  increased  when domestic  price  is lowered  with an  export tariff and 
exports decline  (bottom  rows of Table 7).  In contrast,  the rest of the  world as  a net  importer  benefits  from 
plans increasing  US  exports and  lowering the world price of grains.  As noted  in the World Total column of 
Table  7, any form of market  distortion  lowers overall global welfare. 
Compared  to  Table  7, total  numbers  are  smaller  but  patterns  are  similar  when  only  US  com 
producers  attempt  the optimal subsidy or tariff strategy (Table  8).  A US com-only producer cartel also would 
choose an export subsidy because  the producers' benefits are positive even if  they pay the export subsidy (top 
three  rows in Table  8). 
None  of the  above  results  consider  retaliation  by competitors.  The  US  and  most  other  developed 
countries currently subsidize grain exports.  Each country justifies its subsidy as retaliation  for predatory trade 
policies of  competitors.  A US grain producer cartel subsidizing exports to collect economic rents and lowering 
world prices in the process  (see  top three  rows, Tables  7 and  8) would hurt competing  exporters  who might 
retaliate  in kind. 
9 Table 7.  Impact of US Export Subsidies and Tariffs on Grains. 
Welfare Impacts 
Increase  US  Increase in World 
in US  Price 
Export 
Border  ROW  World  Corn &  Quantity 
Producers  Consumers  Payments  Total  Total  Total  Wheat  Coarse 
Grain 
(Percent)  ($ Million)  (Percent) 
30  4,279  -2,355  -3,128  -1,204  671  -533  -3  -6 
20  2,898  -1,643  -2,018  -754  458  -296  -2  -5 
10  1,377  -793  -893  -309  213  -96  -1  -2 
-10  -1,338  808  741  212  -220  -8  1  2 
-20  -2,729  1,700  1,359  330  -415  -85  3  5 
-30  -3,916  2,494  1,729  308  -582  -274  4  6 
Outcomes  were  simulated  in  which  percentage  increases  in  US  exports  were  matched  by  equal 
percentage  increases in exports of  other major competitors  (Canada, the European  Community, and Australia). 
Because  domestic prices are controlled by border measures,  the results reported  in Table 9 indicated no major 
impacts on US producers  and consumers  compared  to no retaliation.  But exports rise and world grain prices 
fall substantially as subsidies are more  widely expanded  to retaliate  against action of competitors.  Retaliation 
causes  the  average  cost of subsidizing US  exports to nearly double  to  achieve any given percentage  increase 
in exports.  Retaliation  by competing  exporters  removes  much  of the  attractiveness  of US  export subsidies. 
Ifproducers pay for export subsidies, their net gains are sharply eroded  with retaliation.  Welfare losses to the 
US  as a nation and to the world enlarge with retaliation to subsidies.  Thus the US and the world have a stake 
in successful multilateral  negotiation  reducing  subsidies and  attendant  retaliation. 
Even if US grain producers  form a cartel  successful in accumulating  net gains for its members,  doing 
so might alienate  US  voters because  consumers  are  hurt in every feasible  scenario.  It is conceivable that  an 
effort  by producers  to  form  a cartel  would so  alienate  the  public  that  Congress  would terminate  current 
commodity  programs,  including export assistance  on grain.  The  result  of eliminating  1989 US  government 
program support for grains was simulated and the results are  reported  in Table  10.  Net benefits to producers 
from  cartel  activity never  approaches  the  $7 billion in rents  they collect  from  current  programs.  It  seems 
unlikely that a producer  group would risk gains of this size for the prospect of cartel rents  a sixth the size or 
less from  international  markets. 
Identical  cartel  arrangements  to those presented  in this paper were simulated using intermediate-run 
rather than long-run behavioral coefficients.  Producer, consumer, and taxpayer welfare as well as world price 
impacts generally were greater in the intermediate-run  simulations than in the long-run simulations.  However, 
the  overall conclusions for the  intermediate  run were identical  to  those  for the  long run reported  above. 
10 Table 8.  US Export Subsidies and Tariffs on Corn Which Change Export Levels (US  Corn Producer Cartel). 
Welfare Impacts 
Increase in US  US  Increase in World 
Corn Export  Price 
Quantity 
Producers  Consumers  Border  Total  ROW  World  Corn 
Payments  Total  Total 
(Percent)  ($ Million)  (Percent) 
30  2,274  -1,546  -1,991  -1,262  674  -588  -12 
20  1,636  -1,131  -1,342  -837  473  -364  -9 
10  806  -571  -597  -361  224  -137  -5 
-10  -783  584  437  238  -249  -11  5 
-20  -1,543  1,185  701  342  -365  -23  10 
-30  -2,099  1,648  773  323  -469  -146  15 
Table 9. US Export Subsidies and Tariffs on Grains With Like Retaliation in Subsidy and Tarifffrom Grain Exporters - Canada, EC, and Australia. 
Welfare Impacts 
US  Increase in World Price 
Increase in 
Exports by All  Producers  Consumers  Border  Total  ROW  World  Wheat  Corn & Coarse 
Four Regions  Payments  Total  Total  Grain 
(Percent)  ($ Million)  (Percent) 
30  4,378  -2,466  -3,931  -2,018  262  -1,756  -9  -9 
20  2,970  -1,714  -2,537  -1,281  284  -997  -6  -7 
10  1,395  -825  -1,117  -574  183  -364  -3  -3 
11 Table 10.  Welfare Impact of US Unilateral Grain Subsidy Liberalization, $ Million. 
Producers  Consumers  Taxpayers  Total US 
-7,236  176  8,546  1,486 
Conclusions 
Various  cartel  arrangements  offer possibilities to  raise economic  rent  to  grain producers.  However, 
gains to producers  from export market  rents are small relative to gains from commodity programs.  Faced with 
a choice between  cartel  exploitation of export markets  versus current  commodity  programs,  producers  have 
reason  to  favor current  programs  to  raise  their incomes. 
Restrictions  on grain production and marketing  raise producers' income while reducing the economic 
well-being  of US  consumers  and  the  public  at  large.  Most  of the  export  cartel  gains  come  to  US  com 
producers  who account  for over 40 % of the world supply.  Ceteris paribus, greater  market  share  raises  cartel 
rents.  An international  cartel, where growers from several large exporting countries band together  to restrict 
supply, accumulates  greater  rents  than when anyone exporter alone  restricts  supply.  But  the  more  effective 
the  scheme  is  in raising rents  to  grain producers,  the  larger  become  the  global distortions  and  net  welfare 
losses to consumers  and the  world economy. 
Subsidies  increasing  US  grain exports  to  extract  cartel  rents  encounter  problems  when competing 
exporters  retaliate.  Even in cases  where  a cartel of producers  seems  to have potential  for generating  rents, 
shortcomings  such  as  the  administrative  burden  and  complexity of implementation  need  to be considered. 
Subsidies would require  control of all grain shipments  into the US.  Export subsidies expanding market  share 
are  a violation of General  Agreement  on Tariffs and  Trade  provisions and  run  counter  to  current  trends 
toward  liberalizing trade  apparent  in farm  policy reforms  of the  EC,  Australia,  New  Zealand,  Sweden,  and 
selected  other countries. 
No account  of cartel  administrative  costs was made  in this study.  The export subsidy scheme  would 
be expensive to  administer  because  of the  necessary  border  controls.  The  simulation  results  unrealistically 
assume  perfect cooperation  among  all cartel  members.  Cheating  on production quotas  or selling outside the 
cartel  would reduce  net  benefits  to producers. 
In conclusion, our analysis shows that  at  least  modest  national  welfare  gains are  possible  from  US 
grain  export  tariffs.  Such  tariffs  would  be  applauded  by  our  export  competition  but  are  domestically 
unacceptable  for two reasons.  The  first is that  American  grain producers  are  made  worse off.  The  second 
is that  an export tax may be unconstitutional.  In all other scenarios  considered,  the  US  economy loses from 
cartel action to subsidize exports or control production.  In all scenarios considered, the world as a whole loses 
income  from cartel  intervention  in markets.  The  modest  net gains to producers  from  subsidies  and  supply 
restrictions  balanced  against large negatives listed above do not present  a bright outlook for grain cartels. 
Preliminary analysis indicated  that  gains to  US  producers  are  less for a wheat cartel  than  for either 
the feed  grain cartel or for the wheat-feed  grain cartel  included herein.  The unfavorable outcomes  originate 
from the export demand  for US wheat made  highly elastic by opportunities  to substitute feed  grain for wheat 
in  production  and  consumption  especially  in  the  long  run.  That  is,  a  high  wheat  price  and  controlled 
production  of wheat  encourages  importers  to  produce  wheat,  cut  back  feed  grain  production,  and  import 
low-cost feed  grains.  Because  results were less favorable for wheat alone than for feed  grains alone or for all 
grains, predicted  outcomes  of a wheat cartel  were not included. 
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